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Using unique personnel data from one Russian firm for the years 1997 to 2002 we
study the size, development and determinants of the gender earnings gap in an internal
labor market during late transition. The estimated gender earnings gap at the firm
level falls from about 38 percent in 1997 to 18 percent in 2002. Gender earnings dif-
ferentials are largest for production workers, who constitute the largest employee
group in the firm. Various decompositions show that these differentials and their dy-
namics remain largely unexplained by observable characteristics at the mean and
across the wage distribution. Our analysis also reveals that the earnings differentials
for production workers largely stem from job assignment, as women are predominately
assigned to lower-paid jobs. Earnings gaps within job levels are small and almost fully
explained by observed characteristics. The convergence of male and female earnings
is largely driven by an increase in the rewards for women, which is most pronounced
in the lower part of the distribution.
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1 Introduction
Research on the gender wage gap in labor markets in
transition is part of a more general agenda that fo-
cuses on the question of whether transition has
caused a worsening of the position of women in the
labormarket orwhether they have benefited from the
liberalization of the economic system. In this paper,
we analyze the size, development and determinants of
the gender earnings gap within a large Russian firm.
In Soviet times gender equality was one of the tenets
of the regime’s ideology. The labor market participa-
tion of women was high and discrimination in pay
formally absent. However, socialist reality was
somewhat less rosy for women, as they were con-
fronted with the difficult task of combining work in
the household with the job in the enterprise and as
they found themselves predominantly in “female”
occupations that commanded lower wages. Occupa-
tional segregation thus led to the existence of a gen-
der wage gap under socialism, part of which was un-
explained by observed productivity characteristics
(Malceva and Roshchin 2006).
With the onset of the transition from a centrally
planned to a market economy the socio-economic
structures in Russia saw dramatic changes that had
more pronounced effects for women: a collapsing
welfare system and a substantial reduction in child-
care facilities were accompanied by a sharp increase
in open unemployment, but also the possibility to
specialize in home production as an alternative to
market work for the first time in generations. In addi-
tion, the restructuring of many privatized enterprises
and the increase in competition in product markets
through trade liberalization as well as the entry of de
novo private firms had a profound impact on devel-
opments in the Russian labor market. For the most
part, these developments have changed the situation
of women for the worse; in particular they have dras-
tically reduced life-long employment opportunities in
large firms and have made labor market attachment
for women in general more tenuous. This overall
change in the position of women in the Russian labor
market needs to be kept in mind when analyzing the
issue of gender earnings differentials in that country.
One strand of the literature on the gender wage gap
(GWG) in transition countries compares the GWG
just before the transition to the gap in the early years
of transition. In this literature, the initial regime switch
is perceived as a quasi-natural experiment that pre-
sumably enables researchers to establish a causal ef-
fect of transition on the gender wage gap in former So-
cialist economies. As stressed by Jurajda (2005) and
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Brainerd (2000), there are above all three forces
simultaneously determining the dynamics of the
GWG pre- and post-transition. On the one hand, a
dramatic widening of the wage distribution, as hap-
pened for example in Russia and Ukraine, can
increase the gap since women are predominately lo-
cated in the lower part of thewage distribution (Brain-
erd 2000). On the other hand, if low-skilled women
leave employment on a large scale, aswas observed for
EastGermany byHunt (2002) and for Slovenia byOr-
azem and Vodopivec (2000), and if this effect domi-
nates, the gap can be reduced. A second determinant
potentially lowering the wage gap after the regime
switch are increasing returns to educational attain-
ment and other productivity characteristics after the
liberalization of the labor market. Brainerd (2000)
provides convincing evidence that these higher returns
reduce the GWG in several Central European transi-
tion countries since their female workforces are on
average better educated than their male counterparts.
The few studies which are specifically about gender
differentials in the Russian labor market all use
household survey data. In contrast to Brainerd’s re-
sults, Reilly (1999) finds a stable monthly earnings
differential of about 37 percent Ð and an hourly
wage gap of roughly 25 percent Ð for the years 1992
to 1996. He establishes, though, that the “unex-
plained” part grows over the reported period. The
research by Ogloblin (1999), also covering the early
years of the Russian transition (1994 to 1996), sug-
gests that occupational segregation explains most of
the gender wage gap. Using panel data, the study by
Kazakova (2007) covers a more mature stage of the
Russian transition and, using a panel with full wage
data, finds that the GWG decreases from 35 percent
in 1996 to 16 percent in 2002.
Our paper employs personnel panel data of a large
Russian manufacturing firm and analyzes the gender
earnings gap (GEG) within this firm for the years
1997 to 2002.1 This is the first study not only for
Russia, but for any transition economy, that uses
personnel data to look at gender differentials within
a firm. Our analysis of gender differentials with the
help of personnel data contributes in several ways to
the literature on gender discrimination in transition
economies in general, and in Russia in particular.
First, we can establish whether the substantial Rus-
sian earnings gap that researchers find with house-
hold level data “survives” when we look at the in-
1 We look at the gender earnings gap and not at the gender wage
gap because we do not have precise information on hours worked
in our data.
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ternal labor market of a large Russian firm. It could
well be that most of the earnings gap observed with
household data comes about because of productivity
differences between men and women and their sort-
ing into firms which pay high wages and those which
pay low wages (Kremer 1993). Our estimates of the
gender earnings gap inside the firm are very similar to
estimates of the gender earnings gap obtained from
household data with wages paid in full. Second, we
explore changes in the gender earnings gap. Again,
we find that the development of the gender earnings
gap at firm level mirrors the economy-wide develop-
ment of the gender earnings gap in Russia: in line
with the results of Kazakova (2007) we establish a
large reduction in the gender differential from
around 38 to 18 percent. Third, given that the earn-
ings differential “survives” within a large privatized
firm like ours Ð one should bear in mind that a large
proportion of the Russian workforce is still employed
in such firmsÐ we investigate at the mean and across
the entire distribution howmuch of the differential is
explained by observed characteristics. Fourth, we test
several hypotheses about the determinants of the un-
explained part of the gap. For example, we test
whether women are willing to receive lower wages in
return for larger bonuses, whether female employees
are willing to trade off wages for employment secu-
rity, or whether segregation of womenwithin the firm
into low job levels provides an explanation for the
gap.2 Finally, we investigate the determinants of the
gender earnings gap and changes therein. Employing
methods introduced by Juhn, Murphy and Pierce
(1991) andMachado andMata (2005) we explore var-
ious factors influencing the changes in gender dif-
ferentials cited above, namely changes in earnings in-
equality, changes in the composition of the workforce
and changes in the returns to productivity character-
istics. While the exploration at the means provides
some new insights about the causes of the reduction
in the gender gap, the analysis across the entire distri-
butions is new for Russia and of particular interest as
it shows that the driving force behind the reduction in
the earnings gap is brought about by changes in the
lower part of the earnings distributions.
The analysis of the gender earnings gap with the
help of personnel data can be considered an impor-
tant complementary exercise also for methodologi-
cal reasons. Recent work with matched employer-
employee data for Western economies has shown
that firm-specific effects constitute an important de-
terminant of gender differentials (see e.g. the evi-
dence for the United States by Bayard et al. 2003,
2 Ransom and Oaxaca (2005) find that such segregation in a re-
gional grocery chain in the United States goes a long way towards
explaining the earnings gap.
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and for Germany by Heinze and Wolf 2006 and
2007). If one is unable to control for segregation at
the level of the establishment, as is the case with
household survey data, one overstates the role of
occupational and/or sector segregation in the econo-
my. Using matched data one can provide evidence
of within-establishment and within-occupation seg-
regation. The use of such data might also reduce the
bias from unobserved heterogeneity by focusing on
selected samples of more homogeneous groups of
workers (Kunze 2008). Employing personnel data in
the analysis of the GEG might have the advantage
of reducing unobserved heterogeneity to a greater
degree than can be done with other types of data
because of the likely more homogeneous nature of
the workforce within one particular firm. With per-
sonnel data it is also better possible, as Kunze (2008)
notes, to “more credibly investigate whether wage
gaps still exist when job characteristics and rank are
controlled for.” While personnel data from one firm
can never be truly representative of a sector or the
economy on the whole, it permits us to explore in-
ternal labor markets in large organizations from a
gender perspective and pin down those factors that
contribute to differential treatment of men and
women within such organizations. Due to data scar-
city only few studies on the gender gap within large
firms exist; however, their results certainly shed ad-
ditional light on the causes of gender differentials.
For example, Barnet-Verzat and Wolff (2008) ana-
lyze personnel data on executives of a French firm
and document that the GEG is rather small, ranging
from 2 to 5 percent across the entire distribution,
once hierarchical levels are controlled for, but they
do find evidence of a “glass ceiling” effect.3
Data scarcity has made it difficult for economists to
test implications for the gender earnings gap that
derive from theoretical approaches. Two models
come especially to mind. Lazear and Rosen (1990)
assume that women have a higher expected value of
time spent at home, which implies that they have a
higher separation probability and require a higher
ability threshold in order to be promoted. Two im-
portant predictions arise from this model: promo-
tion rates (and thus wages) do not differ by gender
at very high levels of ability, and female wages on
average are lower within a firm since they are un-
derrepresented in highly paid jobs. Booth, Fran-
cesconi and Frank (2003) moot that even if the same
number of women were promoted as men, this
might not automatically attenuate the gender earn-
ings gap. If women have fewer market opportunities
3 See also Ransom and Oaxaca (2005) for gender differences in
pay, mobility and promotion opportunities within a U.S. firm and
Jones and Makepeace (1996) for evidence from a U.K. firm.
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outside the firm upon promotion, they might be pro-
moted to the same degree or might even have a
higher promotion rate, but they receive lower wage
increases than men after promotion has occurred.
Since we can identify managers in our firm, i. e. high
ability employees, we can provide an additional data
point to test the predictions of these two models,
albeit in a partial fashion.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:
the next section briefly describes the firm: the posi-
tion in its product market, the ownership structure
as well as its wage and employment policies. Sec-
tion 3 describes the personnel data and measure-
ment issues associated with gender differentials. Sec-
tion 4 introduces the methods used to analyze them.
Section 5 presents the results in three parts. First, we
describe the gender earnings gaps and their decom-
positions in explained and unexplained parts at the
means and across the distributions. Then we explore
the various determinants of the gaps, which we enu-
merated above. A third part looks at changes in the
gaps and which of the factors cited above can help
explain these changes. A final section provides some
tentative conclusions.
2 The firm and its wage and
employment determination
The particular firm for which we have data is located
in a provincial city in Russia and operates in the
sector “machine building and metal works.” After
having converted the production lines from Soviet
times “nearly one hundred percent”, according to
the director general of the firm (CEO)4, it produces
well equipment for gas and oil production and
smith-press equipment. More than ninety percent of
its production is destined for the Russian market. It
has no competitors locally, but nationally it has to
compete with more than five firms, among them
firms from the European Union that export oil
equipment to Russia. Nevertheless, being a supplier
for the Russian oil industry it has been benefiting
from the continuous robust growth which this indus-
try has experienced since the aftermath of the finan-
cial crisis.5 At any rate, real output, capacity utiliza-
4 Source: First interview with the director general of the firm in
the spring of 2002.
5 During the financial crisis and in its aftermath, we observe the
following monthly inflation rates: August ’98 19%, September ’98
39%, October ’98 5% and April ’99 3%. Using the standard
definition, where we speak of hyperinflation when the monthly
inflation exceeds 50 percent, it is clear that we cannot speak of a
hyperinflationary episode in the Russian economy in 1998 and
1999. Moreover, there is a rapid decline of monthly rates.
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tion and profits were all in a trough in 1998, recov-
ered slightly in 1999 and then took off dramatically
after the year 2000.6
How representative is this firm as far as the sector
“machine building and metal works” and Russian
industry on the whole is concerned? Many priva-
tized large firms in the sector and in Russian indus-
try were shedding labor while our firm slightly in-
creased its workforce over the reported period. The
CEO is considered one of the successful managers
in Russian industry as, early on in the transition, he
initiated the conversion of production from military
hardware to equipment serving the Russian oil in-
dustry. In our opinion, therefore, this firm is repre-
sentative of a perhaps small but in economic terms
important number of industrial firms that have man-
aged the transition to a market-based economy well
and which are leaders in their sectors with a brighter
future than the average large privatized Russian in-
dustrial firm.
The employees in this firm do not seem to influence
wage and employment determination in ways that
can partially shape gender earnings gaps within Rus-
sian firms. Employees could have this influence
above all through two routes. First, corporate govern-
ance structures related to privatization and the distri-
bution of shares have an impact on the process of how
wages and employment are determined. The firmwas
founded in the early 1950s and privatized in 1992. A
decade later, in 2002, more than half of the shares
were owned by managers and employees still work-
ing in the firm. Frompublished annual financial state-
ments we know, however, that employees with shares
have no voting rights and that the CEO and a few
6 Some additional remarks about the economic environment in
which the firm operates are in order. The years 1997 to 2002 in-
clude the financial crisis of August 1998 when the rouble was
drastically devalued and Russia defaulted on its debt. For our
purposes, the crisis is important in so far as it marks a hiatus in
the Russian transition process. Before the crisis we have a period
of great turmoil and excessive turnover in the labor market, with
a large proportion of the workforce experiencing wage arrears
and being forced to take unpaid leave (Lehmann, Wadsworth and
Acquisti 1999, and Earle and Sabirianova 2002). In the aftermath
of the crisis, robust growth started to lift the Russian economy
out of its trough, to raise productivity and wages and to reduce
the extent and incidence of wage arrears. While the financial crisis
had some severe consequences in the form of an upsurge in infla-
tion and a collapse of a large part of the private banking sector,
these consequences were very short-term and had little influence
on the real economy. We should also stress that the short-lived
nature of the crisis prevented the inflationary upsurge in August
and September 1998 from being transformed into persistent infla-
tionary pressures and prevented the crisis from leading to a major
reallocation of resources employed by the economy. In actual
fact, in our firm but also in many other firms in industry we ob-
serve an increase in the capacity utilization of existing resources
(Kapeliushnikov 2005).
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leading managers have a large enough proportion of
voting shares to dominate all aspects of firm decision
making, including wage and employment policies.
There is also the possibility that large dividend pay-
ments, paid to a subset of employees and varying over
time, could cause differential wage payments across
the workforce. However, from the same published
statements of the firm we can infer that annual divi-
dend payments to employees areminiscule relative to
total annual compensation. In essence, corporate
governance structures in this firm neither give em-
ployees any direct influence over the wage setting
process nor do they confound the levels and the dif-
ferentiation of wages.
Second, labor market institutions, in particular col-
lective wage bargaining, might have a large impact
on wage levels and wage differentials. So, how im-
portant are trade unions in this firm? From a second
interview with the CEO, which took place in April
2007, and from discussions with the director of hu-
man resources that took place earlier we can gather
that, while there is collective bargaining at the firm
on paper, trade union representatives have virtually
no influence on wage policy.7
Our discussion consequently implies that wages are
set unilaterally by top management, which is, how-
ever, influenced in its wage policies by local labor
market conditions and the need to keep worker turn-
over at optimizing levels (Dohmen, Lehmann and
Schaffer 2007). Given the dominance of top manage-
ment it therefore seems only natural to ask the CEO
directly how he sees the wage determination process.
When asked what determines wages, the CEO
pointed to the following determinants: (a) the em-
ployee’s qualification level; (b) work tenure/seniority
and experience; (c) wage level in the region; (d) wage
level in the sector; and (e) price of the order to which
the worker is assigned. From the CEO’s declaration
it transpires that there is no taste for discrimination
on the part of this employer, and a female employee
with the same qualification level, tenure and experi-
ence as her male counterpart should earn the same
wage or receive the same total compensation. As we
shall see, this is far from the case in this firm.
3 Data and measurement issues
We created an electronic file based on records from
the personnel archive of the firm, and constructed a
7 The fact that employees as shareholders or through their trade
union lack influence over wage setting can, for example, imply
that discrimination against females based on employees’ tastes
(Becker 1957) does not come into play in this firm.
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year-end panel data set for the years 1997 to 2002.
We have records of all employees who were em-
ployed at any time during this period, except for
top managers, whose information is discarded for
reasons of confidentiality. The data contain infor-
mation on individuals’ demographic characteristics
such as gender, age, marital status and number of
children, on their educational attainment, retraining
and other skill enhancement activities before joining
the firm and during tenure at the firm. We also know
the exact date when each employee started work at
the firm as well as his/her complete employment his-
tory before that date. In addition, we know whether
someone worked full-time or part-time as well as a
full week or not. For those who separated from the
firm we can distinguish between a voluntary quit,
transfer to another firm, individual dismissal, group
dismissal and retirement.
In Russian firms the workforce is often divided into
five employee categories: administration (i. e. man-
agement), which we label “managers”; accounting
and financial specialists, whom we label “account-
ants”; engineering and technical specialists (includ-
ing programmers), whom we subsume under the
term “engineers”; primary and auxiliary production
workers, whom we label “production workers”; and
finally, service staff. The distribution of the work-
force across these employee categories is shown in
table 1 as are the shares of female workers in each
category. We should note here that in this firm em-
ployees dealing with financial issues, i. e. “account-
ants”, are all female apart from 2 persons, which
means, of course, that we do not analyze an earnings
gap for this employee category. It is also worth men-
tioning that, apart from the declining proportion of
female service staff, the shares of female employees
remain fairly constant between 1997 and 2002.
For the years 1997 to 2002 we have monthly wages
averaged over the year, and information on the three
types of bonuses paid to the workforce: (1) a monthly
bonus amounting to a fixed percentage of the wage;
(2) an extra annual bonus whose level depends on
“the results of the year” (i. e. this bonus is a form of
profit sharing); (3) an annual bonus labeled “other
bonus”. While production workers never receive a
monthly bonus, the bonus labeled “other bonus” is
paid to production workers only. Wages are reported
by the firm as the employee’s average monthly wage
in roubles for the year (or fraction of the year if not
employed for the full 12 months), with no adjustment
for inflation. The monthly bonus is reported as a per-
centage of the average monthly wage, and the corre-
sponding rouble figure is recovered by applying the
percentage to the nominal monthly wage. The other
two bonuses are reported in nominal roubles. The in-
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flation rate in Russia during this period was irregular
and sometimes quite highÐ the price level more than
doubled between the start of the financial crisis in
July 1998 and April 1999, and was 0Ð2% per month
before and after Ð so some care is required to con-
struct appropriate deflators. Because the nominal
average monthly wage and the nominal monthly bo-
nus are averages for the year, they are deflated into
1997 constant roubles using an annual average CPI,
i. e. the average price level for the year relative to the
average price level in 1997. The other two bonuses
are paid around the end of the year, and so these are
converted into 1997 constant roubles using the CPI
price level for December of the corresponding year,
i. e. the December price level in that year relative to
the average 1997 price level.8 The shares of the
8 Wehave availablemonthly data onCPI inflation inRussia overall
and in the oblast where the firm is located. In this paper we work
primarily with average monthly wages, and so we compare average
annual inflation in the oblast with national rates. This shows that
inflation in the oblast is very similar to national inflation:
Russia Oblast
1997 15.4 14.0
1998 38.1 38.7
1999 98.6 97.9
2000 20.8 20.4
2001 21.6 19.1
2002 16.0 14.5.
These indices are based on average monthly price levels calcu-
lated using monthly inflation rates. Over the 1997Ð2002 period
the cumulative price indices diverge by less than 3%. Results
using wages and bonuses deflated by the national CPI are there-
fore essentially identical to those using the oblast CPI. We use
the former in what follows.
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monthly total compensation components are pre-
sented in table 2.
The careful approach to generating real earnings
outlined above and the fact that the earnings data
are taken from the personnel records of the firm
lead us to surmise that any measurement error is
minimal in these earnings data. At any rate, it is
highly unlikely that there are systematic differences
in the accuracy of the earnings data across the two
genders that are responsible for the estimated gen-
der earnings differentials.
Within the firm’s workforce, production workers are
subdivided into levels, primary production workers
having eight and auxiliary productionworkers having
six levels. Since we have these levels only for the
cross-section of 2002, we perform decompositions for
this cross-section in order to see whether segregation
into levels might be an important driving force of
earnings and total compensation gaps in this firm.
In the data set at hand no hours of work are recorded,
hence we cannot calculate an hourly wage. The gap
that we can identify is thus a gap in monthly wage
earnings, most of which could be driven by differ-
ences in hours worked. To ensure that the earnings
differential does not just reflect differences in hours
worked we only include employees who were always
full-time employees and worked a full week every
week throughout 1997Ð2002. This leads to the exclu-
sion of 14 percent of the firm’s employees from our
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analysis, but also increases our confidence that the
identified earnings gap is not spurious.9
4 Methods
In order to document and analyze the firm-level
gender earnings gap in a Russian firm, we use well-
known decomposition techniques. The decomposi-
tions that we perform for mean earnings are stan-
dard fare and are therefore only briefly mentioned.
We start with the traditional Oaxaca-Blinder de-
composition (Oaxaca 1973; Blinder 1973), which re-
lies on estimating separately two Mincerian log
earnings equations by gender. As is well known, the
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is subject to the so-
called “index number problem” and requires the use
of either the male or female earnings structure as a
non-discriminatory benchmark. To remedy this prob-
lem, Neumark (1988) and Oaxaca and Ransom
(1994) advocate a pooled model for both genders
using a weighted average of the female and male
earnings structures.10
Decomposing the earnings gap at different quantiles
of the earnings distribution using the Oaxaca-
Blinder method can produce biased results. Their
methodology is based on the OLS property that
mean earnings conditional on average characteris-
tics is equal to unconditional mean earnings, an as-
sumption that does not hold in the context of quan-
9 The existence of overtime, which is only recorded indirectly in
our data, does not allow us to impute hourly wages.
10 We use Stata 9 routines to perform these decompositions, in
which standard errors are calculated as in Jann (2005).
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tile regression.11 In order to decompose the gender
earnings gap at different quantiles we use the quan-
tile decomposition technique proposed by Machado
and Mata (2005). Denote by Qθ(ln w | X ) the log of
earnings of individual i with characteristics X who
leaves behind a fraction θ of individuals with the
same characteristics (Koenker and Basset 1978).
The earnings gap can then be decomposed as fol-
lows:
Qθ(ln wm)-Qθ(ln wf )=[Qθ(Xm ˆmθ)-Qθ(Xf ˆmθ)]+
+[Qθ(Xf ˆmθ)-Qθ(Xf ˆ fθ)]+ residual (1)
The first difference on the right-hand side shows the
contribution of the differences in characteristics be-
tween males and females to the earnings gap at the
quantile θ, and the second difference presents the
contribution due to differences in coefficients. The
residual should disappear asymptotically as the sam-
ple is generated randomly. Note also that the usual
“index number problem” is present in this decompo-
sition and we use the earnings structure of males as
the non-discriminatory benchmark.
Practical implementation of this decomposition re-
quires making B independent random draws of per-
centiles θ and estimating B quantile regressions
(here B = 10,000) for each percentile θ and for
males and females separately: Qθ(ln w | X ) = X θ.
Then, a random sample of size B is created from
covariates X for each gender. Finally, the counter-
factual earnings distributions are generated for dif-
ferent combinations of genders. That is, the counter-
factual earnings density ln w = Xf ˆmθ shows the log
11 See Felgueroso et al. (2007).
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of earnings arising if women had their own charac-
teristics but were paid as men, while ln w = Xm ˆ fθ
shows a counterfactual earnings density that would
arise if individuals were given males’ characteristics
but were paid as females. Using the generated coef-
ficients and characteristics, we estimate the earnings
gaps at different quantiles of the constructed earn-
ings distributions.
Finally, we also decompose changes in the earnings
gap over the period 1997Ð2002. First we perform
the decompositions at the mean, exploiting the well-
known methodology originally proposed by Juhn,
Murphy and Pierce (1991) and applied by Brainerd
(2000) and Reilly (1999) when analyzing changes in
the Russian wage gap in the early years of transi-
tion. Second, we perform similar decompositions at
the quantiles of the earnings distributions, generat-
ing intertemporal counterfactuals based on the
methodology of Machado and Mata (2005).12
5 Results
5.1. The gender earnings gap inside
the firm: description
The aftermath of the financial crisis saw a substan-
tial rise in the consumer price index and a fall in
real wages, both across the country and within our
firm (Dohmen, Lehmann and Schaffer 2007). In-
spection of figure 1 leads to two obvious conclu-
sions: (1) mean male earnings are higher than their
female counterparts, and the mean earnings gap
seems to decline as the probability mass linked to
higher male earnings is reduced in 2002; (2) the gen-
der-specific earnings distributions for all employees
and for workers are shifted to the left over the
period 1997 to 2002 and the distributions are more
compressed in 2002.13 When we discuss the reasons
for the decline in the earnings gap below, it is rele-
vant that inequality already falls as early as 1998 and
that the values of the Gini are always highest for
the entire workforce and the employee categories in
1997.
12 In a transition context, the Machado-Mata (2005) methodology
was also employed by Ganguli and Terrell (2005), who analyze the
gender wage gap in Ukraine both within years and across time.
13 The reduction in earnings inequality is reflected in falling Gini
coefficients of monthly wages and total compensation as shown
in Dohmen, Lehmann and Schaffer (2008). The Gini coefficients
reported in that paper corroborate the decline in inequality of
monthly wages and total compensation for the entire workforce
as well as for the five employee categories in the aftermath of the
financial crisis.
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Figure 2 traces the raw GEG for four employee cat-
egories and all employees in our firm over the years
1997 to 2002. Recalling that production workers
make up roughly two thirds of all employees, it is
clear from the figure that their GEG is driving the
overall gender earnings differential. Apart from the
years at the beginning and the end of the period, engi-
neers have the second highest earnings gap, which is,
however, roughly 30 percentage points lower than
that of production workers in most years. The earn-
ings gap of service workers exhibits a U-shaped
curve, with gaps of roughly 20 percent in 1997 and
2002 but hovering around zero during the rest of the
period. Finally, managers have a very small raw gen-
der earnings differential whose adjusted variant is not
significant in any year.14 This result is in line with the
predictions of Lazear and Rosen’s (1990) model that
women, once finding themselves in high positions
within the same firm, will not experience different
treatment from that of men.
The regressions on which the adjusted gender earn-
ings gaps of figures 3 and 4 are based are shown for
the years 1997 and 2002 in table 3. These regressions
point to the determinants of log real earnings at the
mean and at several quantiles in the distributions.
Apart from the gender dummy, which has a large
and highly significant impact throughout, tenure and
educational attainment as well as training outside
the firm increase earnings, while studying in the firm
and within-firm mobility, which is predominantly of
a horizontal nature, depress them. Service workers
have substantially lower, engineers somewhat lower
earnings than production workers, while managers
and accountants command an earnings premium on
average. Another specification includes an addi-
tional indicator variable which takes the value one
for females with children (see columns (2) and (7)).
This indicator variable is included in order to allow
for a differential treatment of females with children
by the tax authorities; but the variable may also pick
up mothers’ propensity to trade more flexible work-
ing conditions for lower earnings. For the year 1997
(as well as for the years 1998 to 2001, which are not
shown) this dummy is not significant, while in 2002
women with children encounter an average wage pe-
nalty of 10 percentage points. The adjusted earnings
gap is lowered by precisely this amount in this year.
The total gender earnings gap in figure 3 rises slightly
between 1997 and 1998, when it reaches roughly
40 percent, and then falls continuously to the level of
around 18 percent in 2002. An Oaxaca-Blinder de-
14 The regressions which generate adjusted gender earnings gaps
are not shown here but are available on request from the authors.
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composition15 also produces the result that most of
the GEG at the mean remains unexplained. The re-
gressions by gender underlying the decompositions at
themeans as well as quantile regressions by gender at
selected quantiles are shown for the years 1997 and
2002 in the appendix (tables A1 and A2). In many in-
stances, they show inter-gender differences in the re-
turns tomany of the productivitymeasures employed
in our regressions. To address the concern that the
15 We also performed Neumark (1988) and Oaxaca-Ransom
(1994) decompositions in the earlier version of this paper. In
general, the results were very similar to the Oaxaca-Blinder de-
composition and we decided to report the latter.
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gender earnings gapmight above all be a reflection of
differences in hours worked, we also perform a “ro-
bustness check” by decomposing the GEG for
workers using two earnings measures. As stated
above, workers receive an “other bonus”; this bonus
is paid to workers for additional effort (“completion
of work ahead of plan”), but also in return for over-
time work and work during holidays and on days
which would otherwise have been free. The first mea-
sure is based on monthly wage earnings alone, while
the second one includes in addition the imputed
monthly proportion of the “other bonus” that could
also reflect differences in productivity in a better way.
The two decompositions of the GEG, based on these
two measures, are virtually identical. We are thus led
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to believe that the GEG is not confounded by differ-
ences in hours worked across gender.
The raw and adjusted earnings gaps across the
distribution, shown for the year 1997 in figure 4,
are representative for the gaps in the years 1997
to 2001, which are not shown here, i. e. they show
large differentials in the lower part of the distribu-
tion while in the upper part these differentials
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decline. In contrast to previous years, the gender
earnings gap in 2002 increases over the distribu-
tion from close to zero to about 20 percent.16
16 Results that are based on the specification with the interaction
term female-children are very similar to those in figure 4, al-
though the adjusted gap at several quantiles is somewhat lower.
These results are not shown here but are available on request.
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What is also striking from this figure is that the
gap is approximately 15Ð20 percent at the highest
quantiles in both years even after having con-
trolled for employee type. However, we observe a
“glass ceiling” effect in 2002, which is not present
in 1997 because of the high differential in the
lowest part of the distribution in 1997 (“sticky
floor”) that disappears by 2002.
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The decline of the GEG at the lower quantiles of
the distribution is explored in more detail in Sec-
tion 5.3. The potential explanation is likely to be the
change in the composition of the workforce (i. e.
change in characteristics) together with the change
in returns to productivity characteristics. Other
factors that determine changes in the differential at
the bottom of the distribution have been highlighted
The Gender Earnings Gap inside a Russian Firm Thomas Dohmen, Hartmut Lehmann, Anzelika Zaiceva
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in the literature.17 First, childcare provisions and
parental leave policies may have an impact and they
may have changed in the firm during this period.
For example, women may have chosen to work in
less demanding and thus lower-paid occupations in
exchange for the childcare provided by the firm. In-
deed, like other large enterprises, this firm used to
have its own kindergarten, which, however, became
the property of the municipality in the mid-1990s.
Although not conclusive, this may suggest that in
1997 women were still influenced by the existence
of childcare facilities that were no longer available
in 2002. Second, minimum wages (or high relative
wages at the bottom of the distribution) might lower
the differential in that part of the distribution. How-
ever, in the Russian context minimum wages are not
a binding constraint. A third factor often mentioned
is collective bargaining. As discussed above, the
trade union in this firm is weak and does not influ-
ence wage policies throughout the reported period.
Figure 5, which reproduces results from Machado-
Mata decompositions of the gender earnings dif-
ferentials across the 1997 and 2002 distributions in-
dicates that differences in returns to characteristics
and not the characteristics themselves contribute to
the GEG across the whole distributions. Note also
17 There is a growing recent literature on the “glass ceiling” effect
(see for example, Albrecht et al. 2003, for Sweden; Hübler 2005,
for Germany; Arulampalam et al. 2006, for Western European
countries and Ganguli and Terrell 2005, for Ukraine).
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that while the GEG is lower in 2002 than in 1997,
the proportion of the unexplained part is larger in
2002 across almost the whole distribution.
5.2 The gender earnings gap inside
the firm: potential explanations
Having described the size of the gender earnings gap
both at the mean and at various quantiles, and having
explored the development of the gender earnings gap
over time we now turn to the question of what can ex-
plain the gender earnings gap inside our firm. The data
that we have at our disposal allow us to look at the
following three potential explanations: the trade-off
between premia and wage earnings, the trade-off be-
tween secure jobs and wages and segregation into job
levels forworkers in the year 2002.Of course, discrimi-
nation or selectionmay also serve as potential reasons.
It is conceivable that as premia make up a substantial
part of total earnings, women are willing to accept
lower wages in return for larger premia. Comparing
figure 6, where we show the Oaxaca-Blinder decom-
position of total compensation, with the decomposi-
tion of wage earnings in figure 3 it is quite clear,
though, that the magnitudes and the evolution over
time of the two gaps are fairly similar. Also in both
cases most of the gap remains unexplained. A second
explanation for different pay for female andmale em-
ployees with similar observable characteristics could
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lie in the fact that women trade job security for lower
wage earnings. Probit regressions that estimate the
probability of quitting or being laid off, which are not
shown here, demonstrate, however, that women have
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a 3-percentage-point higher probability of quitting
and are also slightly more likely to be laid off by the
firm, evidence that contradicts the hypothesis of a
trade-off between wages and job security.
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As shown above, production workers make up the
bulk of the firm’s workforce and also experience by
far the largest gender earnings gap. It is therefore
worthwhile taking a closer look at the issue of
whether female workers are segregated into low-
paid job levels while men find themselves in levels
of higher pay. Unfortunately, we currently have in-
formation on levels only for the year 2002 and can
only ascertain the position of a production worker
in the level structure at the end of the period.
Table 4 provides evidence of female production
workers being predominantly confined to the lower
job levels in the firm. Nearly all female production
workers find themselves in the auxiliary levels. Only
in the job level primary 4 can we observe a statisti-
cally significant gender earnings gap (in the level
primary 5 it is significant at the 10 % level), while
in all other job levels average pay is the same for
female and male production workers. So, women
finding themselves in the same job levels as men
generally do not seem to be discriminated against in
terms of pay.18
The GEG for production workers in 2002 of roughly
30 percent, however, comes about because women
have an overwhelmingly lower probability of finding
themselves in primary job levels even when we con-
trol for observable productivity characteristics. This
is made abundantly clear in table 5: in the most par-
simonious specification women have a probability of
being in a primary job level that is 84 percentage
points lower than that of their male counterparts.
Even women with university education are far less
likely to be in a primary job level if they happen
to be engaged in production on the shop floor. In
addition, the Fairlie decomposition shows that only
11 percent of the difference in the predicted proba-
bilities of being in a primary level is explained by
observed characteristics.19
18 Since potentially there are differences in observed characteris-
tics within levels, differences in unconditional means might be
affected by this. No differences in unconditional means, therefore,
does not necessarily mean that there is no “discrimination”, since
we could have the situation that women are paid the same wages
as men even though they have better characteristics. Unfortu-
nately, small sample sizes within levels do not allow us to calculate
regression-adjusted gaps. One way to see whether this potential
bias arises is to regress log earnings on a gender dummy, indivi-
dual characteristics and levels for 2002. The results of these re-
gressions, which are not reported here for brevity, lead us to be-
lieve that this bias might be minor, since the coefficient on the
gender dummy is not significant. In addition, performing Oaxaca-
Blinder and Machado-Mata decompositions with job levels in-
cluded point to no discrimination since the entire gaps become
explained (see below in the text).
19 This evidence is consistent with Ransom and Oaxaca (2005),
who find that within job levels in a US grocery store men and
women are paid the same, but the lower job assignment of women
could not be completely explained by individual characteristics.
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Wage earnings and job levels are, of course, highly
correlated. This high correlation can be seenwhenwe
perform Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions of gender
earnings and total compensation gaps. When we con-
dition on job levels, the entire gaps are explained now
(table 6). Thus, there is no scope for gender discrimi-
nation within a job level. Comparing Machado-Mata
decompositions of gender earnings differentials at
the quantiles with and without conditioning on job
levels leads to the same conclusion: earnings dif-
ferentials across job levels are large, and little of the
earnings differential is explained by characteristics,
while earnings differentials within job levels are
much smaller and are explained almost entirely by
observed characteristics at all quantiles (see figure 7).
Of course, we are aware of the endogeneity of job
levels in the determination of earnings and conse-
quently do not suggest that job levels have a causal
impact on the gender earnings differential.20 Never-
theless, our descriptive exercise points to the remark-
20 It is possible that the gender difference in occupational distribu-
tion partly reflects employment discrimination or unequal occupa-
tional access. If it does, then it cannot be used to “explain” the
GWG (see, for example, Kidd and Schannon 1996 and Rodgers
2006). However, the results with no levels in the regressions can be
viewed as an upper bound for the extent of “discrimination”, and
the results with levels as a lower bound (Arulampalam et al. 2006).
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able fact that there is such a large earnings dif-
ferential in spite of a seemingly gender-neutral wage
policy of the top management in this firm, which
arises because overwhelming numbers of women are
placed in low-paid job levels (cf. Ransom andOaxaca
2005). So far, we only observe the job level of each
production worker at the end of the reported period
and can thus only point to the high correlation of
placement into job levels and gender earnings dif-
ferentials. In future work, once we have data on the
evolution of job levels for each production worker,
we will analyze whether there are important gen-
der differences in promotion rates and in entry-level
jobs.
5.3 Changes in the gender earnings gap
over time and their potential reasons
The 20-percentage-point decrease in themean gender
wage gap between 1997 and 2002 is decomposed using
the Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1991) decomposition.
The results of this decomposition are presented in the
discussion paper version of this paper (Dohmen, Leh-
mann, and Zaiceva 2008). As we show there, about
28 percent of the decrease can be explained by ob-
servables, with changes in observed characteristics
being about four times as important as changes in ob-
served prices. The unobserved factors are almost of
equal importance. About 6 points of the reduction in
the gap comes about because women improve their
position in the male residual wage distribution while
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about 8 points are due to a narrowing of this distribu-
tion. While this last factor has the most weight, the
other factors are jointly more important.21 The fact
that the increase or decrease in inequality has little
impact on movements of the gender earnings gap in
our firm can also be seen by the above-mentioned fact
that the gap grew between 1997 and 1998 while in-
equality decreased between the two years.
In table 7 we compare the earnings gaps of 2002 and
1997 across the distribution and perform several
counterfactual exercises over time, followingGanguli
and Terrell (2005). This enables us to document
whether changes in the characteristics of men and
women or changes in the returns to these characteris-
tics at specific points in the distributions contributed
to the decrease in the gap between 1997 and 2002. As
we can see from row (3) the raw gap declined more at
the bottom than at the top of the distribution (see also
Figure 4). The first counterfactual, denoted gap 1,
asks what the gap would have been if women in 2002
had the characteristics of the female group that we
observe in 1997. Row (6) shows that the gap would
have decreased at the bottom but would have re-
mained almost the same throughout the rest of the
distribution. Hence, women’s characteristics at the
21 In contrast, in the early years of transition, when the Russian
gender wage gap increased dramatically, Brainerd (2000) finds
that the widening of the residual male wage distribution com-
pletely overwhelms and cancels out the first three factors, which
all have a slightly negative impact on the change of the wage
differential in the data that she analyzes.
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bottom of the distribution were better in 1997 than
they were in 2002, but this does not hold in the rest of
the distribution. The deteriorating characteristics at
the bottom do not help us explain the decreasing gap,
though.
The second counterfactual experiment (gap 2) asks
what the gap would have looked like if in 2002 the re-
turns to women’s characteristics had been those of
1997 (row 7). Under this counterfactual scenario, the
gap would have been negative at the top, i. e. women
would have fared better than men, and would have
risen a lot at the bottom (row 9). Thus a large increase
in the “prices” of women’s characteristics at the bot-
tom is an explanation of the larger decline in the gen-
der earnings gap at the bottom of the distribution.We
perform the same counterfactual experiments for
men. Their results can be briefly summarized as fol-
lows. At the 10th decile men’s characteristics were
slightly better in 1997 than in 2002 and the deteriora-
tion of these characteristics contributed to a decrease
in the gap to a small extent. Returns to men’s charac-
teristics, on the other hand, declined between 1997
and 2002 and contributed to the reduction in the gap
throughout the distribution, although this reduction
was higher in the upper part. The upshot of table 7 is,
at any rate, that a substantial increase in the rewards
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for women’s characteristics at the bottom Ð together
with a slight deterioration of male characteristics Ð
generates the larger reduction of the gender earnings
gap in this part of the distribution.
Another possible reason behind the evolution of the
gender earnings gap in Russia pointed out in the
literature is wage arrears. Kazakova (2007) and
Gerry, Kim and Li (2004) moot that because of so-
cial considerations by firms low-paid female em-
ployees see an improvement in the payment culture
relative to low-paid male employees, thus the gap
increases. In our firm data, we only have wage ar-
rears at the end of 1998 when they were at a peak.
However, relative to the country as a whole wage
arrears were of minor importance in the firm and
workers, where we see the largest GEG, actually had
on average only 0.05 months of 1997 wages with-
held while in the Russian economy as a whole the
average worker was confronted with a stock of wage
arrears amounting to 2 months of 1997 wages (Leh-
mann and Wadsworth 2007). Furthermore, Dohmen,
Lehmann and Schaffer (2008) find no gender differ-
ence in the incidence of wage arrears for all em-
ployees, while they find a lower incidence for male
production workers and for female engineers. This
latter fact helps explain the increase in the earnings
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gap that we observe in table 8 when we go from the
whole workforce to the sub-sample of employees
paid in full and the small decrease when we proceed
in the same way with production workers only. Ta-
ble 8 also shows similar decomposition results for
the entire groups and the sub-samples of those paid
in full. It is clear at any rate that the decrease across
the entire period has nothing to do with wage ar-
rears, since after 1999 this firm had no problems in
paying all its employees in full and on time.
A decreasing gender earnings gap could be caused by
the withdrawal of poorly qualified and low-paid fe-
male employees as was demonstrated by Hunt (2002)
for former East Germany. We therefore perform
probit regressions that estimate the probability of sep-
arations. Controlling for a large number of observable
characteristics, employees who find themselves in low
deciles of the employee category specific earnings dis-
tribution at the beginning of the reported period have
the highest propensity to separate from the firm.
However, females finding themselves in the lower
part of these distributions are actually less likely to
separate from the firm. Thus changes in the composi-
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tion of the female workforce do not seem to be behind
the declining gender earnings gap. We should note
that this result also holds in the specification that in-
cludes a female-children interaction dummy.22
Thus far we have only looked at separations in or-
der to explain the change in the composition of the
workforce throughout the distribution. For a com-
plete assessment it is important also to characterize
new entrants into the firm. Since we have no informa-
tion about the population from which these new en-
trants are drawn, we cannot perform regressions that
estimate the probability of being hired. Cross tabula-
tions, however, can be used to compare the character-
istics of new entrants with the characteristics of in-
cumbent employees. These tabulations23 show that in
all years, formales and females alike, the new entrants
have slightly “poorer” characteristics (e.g. they are
slightly less well educated) than the incumbent em-
ployees. We can take this as evidence that the average
“quality” of the stock of female employees does not
improve over time because of new hires. In addition,
the tabulations show that the change in the composi-
tion that we stipulate for male employees in the lower
part of the distribution is not driven by hirings, either.
In summary, the only explanation that seems to hold
up comes from the inter-temporal counterfactuals
that are based on the Machado-Mata method: male
employees with relatively good characteristics find-
ing themselves in the lowest part of the distribution at
the beginning of the period seem to have separated
more frequently from the firm. But most importantly,
an increase in the returns to female characteristics,
which is particularly prevalent in the lower part of the
distribution, seems to be the main driving force be-
hind the shrinking gender earnings gap.
6 Conclusions
We have analyzed the size of the gender earnings gap
and its determinants and development over time
using data from a large Russian firm. Observed char-
acteristics that are related to individual productivity
only explain a small fraction of the gender earnings
gap. The narrowing of the gap at firm level is driven
to aminor degree by gender differences in separation
patterns. In particular, men who are in the lower part
of the earnings distribution but have relatively favor-
able observed characteristics are more likely to sepa-
22 The results of these probit regressions are not shown here but
are presented in table 11 of Dohmen, Lehmann, and Zaiceva
(2008).
23 They are not shown here but are available upon request.
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rate, most probably because they face better outside
alternatives. Women at the lower end of the earnings
distribution have lower separation rates. This is likely
the result of an increase in the returns to female char-
acteristics, which is particularly prevalent in the lower
part of the distribution. Our estimates indicate that
this increase in the rewards for women is the main
driving force behind the decreasing gender earnings
gap.
Equally importantly, our analysis reveals that the
gender earnings gap is largely driven by job assign-
ment rather than by earnings differentials within a
particular job level. For production workers, we have
shown that earnings differentials conditional on the
job level are small to start with and almost entirely
explained by observed characteristics related to pro-
ductivity. Future work has to clarify whether gender
differences in job assignment stem from differences
in unobserved productivity differences or from dis-
crimination in initial job assignment or subsequent
promotion opportunities.
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